A NATION AT CROSSROADS
Nigeria at 61
a nation at crossroads
…where is the missing puzzle?
I do have some sympathy for Nigeria because if we as the UK have one of these problems your country is having today, we will be struggling. Here, you deal with everything, from insurgency to kidnapping, to piracy off the Gulf of Guinea and you don’t have such a large army and police force for a country of this size. The only way you turn this thing around is that government has to build the trust of its people, to have the people working with the government to deal with criminality. That’s how successful anti-criminal operations work- Catriona Laing, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria
By John Austin Unachukwu, Desmond Ekeh and Agbo Agbo
NIGERIA is passing through one of the most difficult periods in its over 60 years of independence. As Ms. Catriona Laing, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria, pointed out in the quote above, the United Kingdom would have struggled with a crisis of this nature. Some countries would have buckled under if confronted with a mere fraction of Nigeria’s crisis.
Two past governments were toppled in Sudan – regimes of the late Ja’afar El-Nimeiri and Omar El-Bashir – because of the rise in the price of bread! Yet, Nigeria is still standing after 11 years of Boko Haram insurgency, bloody herders/farmers clashes, banditry, kidnappings for ransom, cultism, secession threats, oil bunkering and piracy.
What is holding this behemoth of a country?
Why is the almost daily shedding of blood being seen as ‘ordinary’?
Are there solutions to the myriad of security challenges capable of pushing the country off the cliff in this macabre dance of confidence? Are Nigeria’s elites and government complicit in this existential crisis of insecurity?
Why is it appearing difficult for consensus, or common ground, to be arrived at on the way out of this security logjam?
Why are those we have elected to protect us at the state and federal levels persistently busy complaining and shifting blames, instead of taking no-nonsense action to tame the raging insecurity across Nigeria?
Each region has its own‘cocktail of poison’ in this security logjam. The North-east is dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency, the North-west is battling banditry and kidnapping for ransom, the North-central, South-west and South-south are in the throes of a bloody herders/farmers clash which has assumed international dimensions with the infiltration of the zone by foreign armed herders. There is also the issue of Sunday Igboho and the Oduduwa or Odua nation. In the South-east, a new lexicon, “Unknown Gunmen” was thrown into the mix following the resurgence of “Biafra” by the Nnamdi Kanu led Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Eastern Security Network (ESN) groups.
How Did We Get Here?
Farmers/Herder/ Clashes, Cattle Rustling and Banditry Nigeria has experienced a considerable increase in natural resource conflicts since the early 1990s. The increasing clashes between farmers and herders have recently become worrisome, especially in the Middle Belt or North-central Nigeria. Part of the reason for this is not far-fetched: population explosion, large-scale urbanisation, a growing demand for food and fresh farm products in all the regions.
This spreads to various dry season cultivation in many states and, ultimately, and set the stage for the recurring farmers and herders’ clashes.The farmers, usually desperate to meet the growing demand for food items in growing urban centres and to feed their families, took up more of the riverbanks to farm. In some instances, they encountered struggles with the other users, especially the herders and even the marginal fishermen.
The herders’ frustration and hostility came mostly from finding the grazing routes and access to watering points covered by tomatoes, cucumbers, vegetables and other crops planted by the farmers.
Expectedly, this often led to misunderstanding and clashes leading to loss of lives and property. In some instances, local consensus was reached where a corridor is sometimes paved to provide herders and their cattle’s access to water points. We should bear in mind that 90 per cent of our cattle and by products come from pastoralists and contributes between six and seven per cent of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Agriculture overall contributes up to 23 per cent to the national GDP. According to a July 2015 Mercy Corps Memo for Policy Makers, the average household affected by the farmers/herders conflict would experience at least a 64 per cent- and potentially 210 percent or higher-increase in income, if these conflicts were reduced to near zero.
The seed of discord and conflict was gradually sown when security became lax in confronting internal security challenges – there was a remarkable difference between the pre- and post- 1999 periods. Prior to 1999, security was considerably firmer under military rule than it is now.
One of the weaknesses of the Fourth Republic – 1999 till date – is the poor and inadequate response to the security of lives and property. expectedly, internal crises were handled under military.
Now, the police and/or security outfits are required to contain what initially used to be settled by village heads. The advent of democratic rule seems to have opened the floodgate of ethno-religious conflicts which manifested around conflicts like the farmer/herders conflicts.
Painfully, the conflict was later mixed with toxic politics as some politicians have cashed in on the conflicts to feather their dangerous and narrow ethno-religious nests. For example, in the Mambilla Plateau of Taraba State, herders and farmers had lived peacefully for centuries. This is also true of other parts of the country. There was never a history of any clash between the neighbours until around 2001 and 2002, when crises erupted, crises which are believed to have been politically motivated.
Plateau State also witnessed ethno-religious crisis in the early years of return to democratic rule. As a result of the recurring crises between urban Hausa-Fulani Muslim and their Christian neighbours, another scope of conflicts began which set the stage for subsequent conflicts that lasted many years. Expectedly also, herders were caught in middle of these conflicts. The situation has not been different in other states like Nasarawa, Benue, Kogi and Kaduna (Southern Kaduna).
Sadly, just about the same period, we had the infamous Sharia crisis in 2000 which contributed to the already-growing distrust among the urban Hausa-Fulani Muslims and their largely Christian neighbours in most of the Middle Belt and Southern Kaduna. This of course has negatively affected the relationship between the herders and the locals in these areas. This same scenario played out in Benue State where in early January 2018, over 73 people were murdered in cold blood. The undercurrent was that it is in “opposition” to the Anti-Open Grazing law passed by the Benue State House of Assembly.
Since the escalation of the conflict, restricted movement of people, goods, services and increase in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has gradually become the norm. Farmers who produced grains in thousands of bags now produce, if at all, just enough to feed their families in affected areas. In some of the affected areas, many families have relocated to other areas leaving their farms in the care of the District or ward Heads, or any other trusted person. Families that kept cattle in hundreds are left with none.
The result of an NOI-Poll conducted in 2016 has the following results: Herdsmen’s cattle invading farms to graze -48 per cent; Lack of understanding – 13 per cent; Lack of grazing area – 10 percent; Poverty – 5 percent; Tribalism/Ethnicity Issues – 5 per cent; Politically motivated – 10per cent; Land dispute- 3 per cent; Selfish interest of Herdsmen – 3 per cent; Bad governance – 3 per cent; Others… Central to the problem has been the decisions by state governments to convert parts or whole forest reserves into private farms or settlements.
Complex dimensions of Underlying Causes
While farmers and herders were engaging in the North-central, the- phenomenon of cattle rustling by armed bandits – who sometimes are alleged to be usually non-resident – and other elements like ethnicisation, nationalisation and internationalization entered the deadly mix. Disagreements over incursions of cattle onto farmlands and incursions by farmers onto cattle paths were exchanged with both farmers and herders. There were also disagreements between farmers and non-resident pastoralists on the move (the Bokolo/Bororo dimension); finally, there were Fulani youth who move southwards from northern fringe areas during harvests in search of grain stalks.
Some Fulani herders began complaining about the possibility of connivance between local Fulani elements and armed cattle rustlers in the zone. They accused local non-Fulani residents of feeding the rustlers with intelligence and also conniving in marketing the rustled animals, sometimes in the open market.
The nouveaux riche who have acquired cattle refused to rest on their oars as some illegally armed their hired Fulani herders with rifles for the protection of the herds as incidences of rustling increased. This development led to the imposition of a regime of terror in the countryside similar to the Boko Haram terror in the North-east, by armed bandits living in camps in forests.
The crisis gradually took on an ethnic colouration through the activity of the vigilante groups who were largely made of Hausa farmers who were opposed to Fulani herders encroaching into their farmlands.
Vigilante groups in the major farming areas tend to regard Fulani as bandits and treat them as such. Thus, began the opening of another flank in the conflict: the emergence of bandits and banditry.
The bandits began using the ethnicisation of the conflict as a smokescreen to carve out spheres of influence for themselves. Under the pretext of defending Fulani interests the bandits’ demand that all Fulani households should either enlist one of their members into the cause or pay a contribution in kind. When some Fulani herders refused to pay their cattle were rustled or targeted for rustling.
Some have family members kidnapped and were only released after ransom were paid. In their attempt to protect their herds they began arming themselves or started hiring protective guards from the Sahel.
The nationalisation of the conflict as cattle rustling and kidnapping by bandits intensified over the years, especially in the north, settled herdsmen began fleeing to the Middle Belt (Niger-Benue confluence area) and the southern states. As they flee, they were pursued by the bandits and kidnappers who see them as their ‘sources of income.’ It wasn’t long before new conflicts with farmers were ignited along their flight paths.
The conflict became more complex when the armed bandits started pursuing the herdsmen deep into the South. Since the Police which are traditionally saddled with internal security responsibilities could not effectively cope, the military was called in to assist. Before now, the military has been battling Boko Haram insurgents. Rather than abate, the conflict worsened with the military operations on a massive scale.
Many of the bandits simply fled southwards too and set up camps near the fleeing nomads. These well-armed bandits appear to be attacking communities in the south and in the process opening up new national conflict fault lines that we have at the moment. These developments were what informed the Anti-Open Grazing Law, first by the Benue State Government and later by the entire Southern Nigeria in what became known as “The Asaba Declaration” where the 17 governors of the southern states resolved to ban open grazing opting for ranching as the most effective way of containing the conflict.
Benue State Governor Samuel Ortom was the first to proffer the states’ solution to
the incessant killings of his people by insisting on ranching of cattle. Perhaps, he knows too well that if the herds are contained in a location, it would be easier to isolate bandits and explore ways of containing them.
Also, Governor Oluwarotimi Akeredolu, SAN, of Ondo State, expelled armed herders from forest reserves. Again, it is aimed at identifying and separating real herders from bandits. Though his actions were wrongly perceived in some quarters, it is the best foot forward in finding solutions to the lingering insecurity in the land.
The Boko Haram Insurgency
The Boko Haram insurgency began in 2009, when the group started an armed rebellion against the government and people of Nigeria. In 2012, tensions within Boko Haram resulted in gradual split of the group between Salafist conservative faction led by Abu Musab Yusuf al-Barnawi, son of its founder Muhammad Yusuf, who was reportedly killed about two weeks ago and the more dominant, violent faction led by the late Abubakar Shekau who was equally killed by the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) fighters in April, this year.
By 2015, part of Boko Haram had split into al-Qaeda affiliated Ansaru, and Shekau’s faction became ISIS’s West Africa branch. There was a further split when ISWAP emerged two years later.
Boko Haram’s rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of citizens, especially women and children, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women and children are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million IDPs in the North-east by 2017.
Researchers and analysts have identified reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram, among which are poor governance, Nigeria’s endemic corruption, youth unemployment, chronic poverty, incompetent security agencies, the rise of jihadi ideology in response to the West’s war on terror, British colonial legacy, and a lack of adequate education.
The clash of Ideology
Boko Haram’s ideology, which has been fuelling Nigeria’s insecurity for 11 years, is often described as comprising two strands: opposition to democracy and rejection of Western-style education. Yet, the sect’s theology and politics encompass more than hatred for Western influence. Its worldview fuses two broader ideas.
First, there is a religious exclusivism that opposes all other value systems, including rival interpretations of Islam: This exclusivism demands that Muslims choose between Islam and a set of allegedly anti-Islamic practices: democracy, constitutionalism, alliances with non-Muslims, and Western-style education.
Second, there is a politics of victimhood: Boko Haram claims that its violence responds to what it sees as a decades-long history of persecution against Muslims in Nigeria. Boko Haram sees state crackdowns on the sect as the latest manifestation of such persecution. The combination of exclusivism and grievance has provided the ideological framework for Boko Haram’s violence toward the Nigerian state, other Muslims, and Christians.
In line with this ideology, Boko Haram’s leaders tell a provocative story about what it means to be Muslim in Nigeria, a story that seeks to activate fears that ‘pious Muslims’ are losing grounds to the forces of immorality. The leaders’ religious messages may, moreover, have greater appeal than is often assumed. Unlike other movements in the region, however, Boko Haram’s leaders have consistently used extremely narrow criteria to define who counts as a Muslim. The way forward is to counter this violent ideology on all fronts by the government.
The Search for Solutions
Ortom’s Solution: Benue Anti-Open Grazing Law in response to these challenges, rising tensions and cycles of attacks, the Benue State Government passed the legislation that banned open grazing on May 22, 2017. The law prohibits disallows cattle toroam for pasture and water, from November 1, 2017 and called instead for the establishment of ranches.
The Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranches Law, 2017 was met with support and opposition. Those that support the legislation have labelled it the best antidote for farmer-herder conflict in the state. Whereas, those that oppose it claim that the law is discriminatory against herders, does not provide or support the production of alternative livelihoods, and effectively evicts herders from the state.
Despite the conflicting responses, the Open Grazing Prohibition Law took off.
Considered as the “food basket” of the country, the fertile soil and temperate climate of the state offer a favourable environment for farmers and herders to thrive. These two communities have been farming and rearing cattle in Nigeria for centuries, benefiting from mutually beneficial relationships – farmers benefit from cattle manure to fertilize their crops and herders benefit from crop refuse to nutritionally feed their herds. This symbiotic practice tied the wellbeing of the farmer to the wellbeing of the herder and allowed for most disputes between the two groups to be resolved non-violently, through traditional disputes resolution mechanisms.
Since 2000, this interdependence increasingly deteriorated due to changing demography, climate variability, shrinking natural resources, and socio-political manipulation. As a result, violent confrontations have become a major defining feature of their interactions. Combined with country-wide challenges including poverty, unemployment, and reduced livelihood opportunities, competition between farmers and herders for limited resources has isolated and deeply polarized the two groups. Political conflicts in the 2000s, such as in Jos, Plateau State, spread religious and ethnic-based fear throughout the region –isolating groups based on ethnicity and/or religion. Herders are predominantly Muslim and from the Fulani ethnic group and farmers are predominantly Christian.
The political and social underpinnings, especially the endless killings in the state instilled a deeply-seeded fear in the people, thus there was an overwhelming pressure on Governor Ortom to act, and fast. The Anti-Open Grazing Law was endorsed by the people, especially as the people believe the Federal Government would not be able – or willing – to let peace reign in the state because of some perceived interests.
Akeredolu’s Solution
Concerned by the incessant killings and kidnappings in the state,Akeredolu, early this year, gave an ultimatum to unregistered herdsmen to vacate Ondo forest reserves. The Senior Special Assistant to the Governor on Security Matters, Jimoh Dojumo, briefed reporters after the announcement was marred in controversy between the state government and the Presidency.
Dojumo said the vacation order became necessary after considering available options to check incessant kidnapping, killing and destruction of farm crops.
He said the state government had a meeting with the leadership of the herdsmen in the state on how to check activities of armed herdsmen kidnapping and killing people in the state. “I want to believe that President Muhammadu Buhari is not in the picture of what is happening here because if he knew the clear picture of what is happening in Ondo State, there won’t be any negative reaction.
“We voted for him before he became the President and he is there to protect us not to destroy us. The security situation in Ondo State is becoming unbearable, every one of us living in the state know that it’s becoming unbearable to the fact that after the #EndSARS saga, there was never a day that one to two people will not be kidnapped in the state. This situation is embarrassing, disturbing even to the fact that our Amotekun Corps is overstressed and the best thing is to look for a way out which led to the invitation of Fulani and Hausa leaders four days ago where we rubbed minds together to address this issues of insecurity.
“We discovered during the meeting that most of the destruction of farmers’ crops occurred at night time based on night grazing, then the governor banned it,” he said.
Dojumo also raised the issue of underage herders – aged seven or eight – who he said lead over 200 cows to destroy farmlands.
He cited Arimogija in Ose LGA of the state, where herdsmen uprooted the cassava tubers of a particular farmer and gathered it for their cows to feed on.
He said the herdsmen shot at the farmer and his sons when confronted during the act. According to him, anyone who wants to do anything within the forest reserves, which belong to the state government, should get a permit before doing so. “It is very unfortunate that we found ourselves in this situation because all along we have been addressing these issues. We have written to them, invited and dialogued with them, meeting their leaders,” he added.
“Even there was a time we held some workshop with them where the national president of Miyetti Allah was invited to Ondo State just to find a way of addressing this problem and we agreed on some points. He even promised us that this thing will stop, but we discovered that these issues are increasing. Many people have been killed and kidnapped; one of our first class traditional rulers was recently killed by these Fulani herdsmen on his way back to his domain. All these are callous,” Dojumo . Like Benue, Ondo felt compelled toprovide for the safety of its citizens .
Where are we now?
Leonardo Da Vinci once reminds us that there are only three classes of people in our world: those who can see; those who can see only when they are shown; and those who do not and cannot see. Sadly, history, and the present circumstances, have conclusively shown that there is no unanimity on the way forward among Nigerians and their government. Scientists sometimes call this “Anton’s syndrome.” Insecurity has become the most interrogated phenomenon of our time and the result is clear for all to see.
First, experts believe there must be a realisation that we are dealing with legacy problems of underdevelopment, mass poverty and inequality which in turn fuel youth unemployment and violence of varying dimensions. True, the challenges might be “overwhelming” but the solutions are not in anger and addictive baseless fears.
The Nigerian state is undergoing a three-dimensional crisis. The first affects the political economy and it is generated mainly by public corruption over the past four decades that has created a run on the treasury at the national and state levels, threatening to consume the goose that lays the golden egg. The second one is the crisis of citizenship symbolised by ethno-regionalism, the Boko Haram insurgency, farmer-herder killings, agitations for Biafra, militancy in the Niger Delta and indigene/settler conflicts. The third element relates to the frustration of the country’s democratic aspirations in a context in which the citizenry believes in “true democracy” but is confronted with a reckless political class that is corrupt, self-serving and manipulative.
These challenges have largely broken the social pact between citizens and the state. That is why today, Nigerians find themselves in a moment of doubt about their nationhood. It is similar to the two earlier moments of doubt we have experienced, 1966-1970 when we went through a terrible civil war and the early 1990s when prolonged military rule created another round of challenges to the National Project. We survived those two moments but there is no guarantee that we shall survive the third. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the current crisis as an opportunity to surge forward in fixing Nigeria.
Part of the problem today, however, is a real and imminent threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria. In addition, there is an on-going rapid slide into anarchy, precipitated by the most serious collapse in security provisioning in our country, which is confronted by an almost complete lack of leadership or governance response to a multipronged crisis.
Nigerians’ greatest fear should, therefore, be that of a self-fulfilling prophesy. The major outcome of the crisis facing the country has been the erosion of public trust. A toxic atmosphere has developed in which different actors are suspected of developing plots to destroy others. Actions of any form, as well as non-action or late action by governments and institutions are no longer taken at face value but are re-interpreted within narratives of co-ordinated plots by some groups to destroy or eliminate others or to take their land.
In all these, there is no effective and deliberate counter-narrative from government to create hope, peace, mutual trust/harmony and a national goal and aspiration. With almost half the country living in extreme poverty, a generation of young Nigerians has emerged with nothing to lose but their poverty. They are procuring arms and engaging in violence, banditry and insurrectional acts, thereby precipitating the march towards anarchy.
The task before the arms of government should be the reconstruction of the Nigerian state. We cannot allow our political community to continue to crumble and suffer the outcome of state collapse, which Thomas Hobbes had assured us, will make our lives “nasty, brutish and short”. Rebuilding the state must take the form of a new approach based on good governance, in which there is the effective, transparent and accountable use of public resources to provide public goods for citizens.
Search for National Consensus
In May 2012, the “New Fabian Society of the Concerned Professionals” released a statement signed by the following: Prof Pat Utomi, Prof Anthony Kila, Femi Falana (SAN), Tola Mobolurin, Pastor Ituah Ighodalo, Dr. Usman Bugaje, Dr. Muiz Banire (SAN), Dr. Isawa Dogo, Joe Atueyi and Bisi Olowoyo. Entitled: ‘Time to Raise the White Flag,’ the group said: “Our country is crippled. Our compatriots are being slaughtered like chickens all over the country. Insecurity has become the most interrogated phenomenon of our time and the result is clear for all to see. Food inflation is way over 20 per cent and the people are starving because terrorists and bandits have made visits to the farm grave risk to their lives. Meanwhile, tariffs and taxes are going up and incomes are collapsing even as inflation is rising and unemployment soars into record territory. Funding budgets have become a nightmare. Given crude oil price decline and the mismanagement of petrol pricing, refining, importation and distribution, the states are being threatened that FAAC Account meetings to share revenue may be put on hold.”
It decried the lack of imagination in public finance management which keeps out onetization of assets and external sector stimulation of the circular flows of income in Nigeria, further worsens the budget crisis. The stress and tension on the streets are so palpable you could slice the air with a blunt knife.
“A real emergency, whether declared or not, exists. It can be felt in refusal of many to travel even short distances and in the daily shedding of innocent blood across the country. Change is imperative with an urgency of yesterday, far more hurriedly than an urgency of now. It seems the Robert Kaplan prediction of a coming anarchy has finally come. The time for bravado is over. We should raise the white flag of surrender, not to the forces of evil that threaten our way of life but to humble pie. We must tell the world that we need help.
We must shout from the rooftops to the world that they need to come to our aid now or risk the cost of coming late as they did in Rwanda and lose more lives trying to flush out the undesirable in the interest of human solidarity in this our interconnected world, belatedly as was the case in Iraq. We support the call of Professor Wole Soyinka to seek external assistance ASAP to prevent Nigeria from getting on a “one chance” transport on the road to Somalia.”
Understanding the Political Economy of Insecurity At the end of May 2020, “SBM Intelligence” published a report which points us toward the political economy of banditry in Nigeria.
According to the report, nearly $20 million was spent by Nigerians in ransom payments to kidnappers between 2011 and 2020. What is even more frightening is that the larger proportion of that figure (just below $11 million),was paid out between January 2016 and March 2020, indicating that kidnapping is becoming more lucrative. This is one reason why kidnap for ransom has come to stay is the economics surrounding it. It is important to stress that the above figure is only from official reports. Unofficial ransom payments by even the state, such as the nearly one billion naira the government paid to Buharin Daji, a prominent militia leader who operated in Zamfara state in the North-west, was not captured. Since that report was published, kidnappings have been taking place almost on hourly basis.
Nigeria’s current security crises are multifaceted, all of which add to the growth of a shadow economy that looks set to rival the country’s informal economy. The growth of Nigeria’s shadow economy disproves the maxim that crime does not pay. In our clime, it pays and very handsomely too, which is why kidnap kingpins like Evans, Hamisu Bala Wadume, Gana – who was killed by the military in Benue State – amongst others, are accorded a god-like status among those seeking to carve a share of this “national cake”.
According to Cheta Nwanze, a partner at SBM Intelligence, many things fuel the kidnap economy, chief of which are poverty, unemployment, and inequality. But ultimately, there are five pillars on which the kidnap industry thrives: Ungoverned spaces, gang formation, weapons acquisition, communications, and collusion. All of these are issues that can be dealt with if we are serious about solving the problem.
He pointed out in a recent write-up that in the immediate, short term, the solution to the problem of gangs is to invest in security. And curb ungoverned spaces which could be in urban or rural areas. The absence of government means the presence of non-state actors competing with the government to take over the roles of the state, and in turn, set up economies that rival that of the state.
The issue of ungoverned spaces, he stressed, can be solved by genuinely bringing the government closer to the people. This could be achieved by identifying what each region needs, plugging these gaps and setting a target to improve the lives of the people. China had a target to eliminate extreme poverty. Within a generation, the country lifted a hundred million people out of the depths of poverty. They were able to do this by identifying the areas most vulnerable and by using data, they faced the problem head on by getting to work. Ungoverned spaces will not disappear overnight. However it is critical to tackle these because they help in gang formation.
The data available to SBM indicates that in US dollar terms, between the $545,000 paid to secure the freedom of Ernest Ohunyon in Edo State in November 2011, and the $6,868 paid to free Ojo Ekundayo and Benjamin Iluyomade in Ondo State at the end of March 2020, at least $18,343,067 changed hands between victims and kidnappers. It is important to point out that in the earlier years, there were fewer incidents, and larger amounts changed hands. Now there are a lot more incidents for smaller amounts, but the sheer number of incidents, speaking to the democratisation of the kidnap industry, means that the kidnap economy now makes more money. crime, in this case kidnapping, does appear to pay.
Are Solutions in Sight?
In his interview with Arise TV early this month, President Muhammadu Buhari threw the spanner into the works of agitators for the end of open grazing, citing a gazette to that effect. His comments, however, came under attack as agitators insist ranching is the best way forward in the search for solutions to the bloody farmer-herders crisis, banditry and kidnapping for ransom.
Meanwhile, the immediate past Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Alhaji Sabo Nanono confirmed recently that 22 states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) had registered for the National Livestock Transformation Programme (NLTP). The programme seeks a permanent solution to farmer-herder crisis through the establishment of grazing reserves, among others, for herders.
Whether this defers from what the president has in mind still leaves more to be seen. Equally too, it is still early in the day to ascertain whether the death of Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader, will have an impact in the ongoing war on insurgency. It is difficult to see a clear-cut strategy from the government on how it intends to nib in the bud Nigeria’s macabre dance on the cliff.
Nigeria is on the throes of disintegration. It has become a hotbed of insecurity and agitation. The government of Nigeria led by Buhari thinks that defending the indissolubility and indivisibility of Nigeria is his major mandate, instead of the security and welfare of the people. As a result, the use of every instrument of government to quell all forms of agitation and whip every Nigerian into a single file becomes legitimate and a natural logic.
On the other hand, the agitators for either restructuring or self-determination, feel that insecurity, high-handedness, impunity, corruption, constriction of space for freedom of speech and expression, disproportionate appointments and allocation of resources for the good of all, is Buhari’s signature tune.
So, agitation for self-determination by various nationalities is a resurgent response to a seemingly repressive and authoritarian government.
Consequently, the protests and peaceful demonstrations at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters by the various nationalities in Nigeria, particularly the Southern and Middle Belt, Nigeria, comprising the South-west, South-east, South-south and the Middle Belt,under the aegis of the Nigerian Nationalities Alliance for Self-Determination (NINAS), is a response to the quest for a resolution to the Nigerian imbroglio.
This agitation for self-determination has become another leg of the threat to the sovereignty of the Nigerian. How all of these is managed becomes a litmus test to the future of the Nigerian nation.
Will the government halt the dance or simply look the other way as the country slips off the cliff?
Time will tell
